It has been proposed here at Social Matter that the männerbund is the source of civilization. If so, then the männerbund is the source of security—this means security from external threats, security from internal threats, and the security of one’s family and property. The männerbund is a group of men with a shared purpose, beliefs, and experience. Multiculturalism, however, weakens the strength of a männerbund and therefore compromises the security and methods a force uses to secure its territory. Pushed to political extremes, the security of a regime is compromised as it becomes more diverse.
A männerbund is a man-to-man network of relationships. Before the männerbund even forms, each man brings with him his traits, norms, and mores. What many take for granted as basic human understandings turn out to vary by ethnicity, race, or culture. It is not just different food, but different beliefs in child rearing, codes of honor, gender relations and roles, etc. Decisions made between simple circles of friends take on an added factor that is not about optimization when resources must be spent on making the one member of another race, ethnicity, or thede feel included, or not be made to feel they were not selected due to their outgroup status. This management of feelings is a burden other homogeneous groups do not need concern themselves with.
In larger political units, multiculturalism becomes a problem with police and security units, which at their heart are männerbunds for that city, state, etc. to police and protect their tribe. In a homogeneous region, if a criminal enterprise or politically rebellious unit arises, it is easier to observe the problem group with agents. It is also not as difficult to insert an agent into the target unit to provide intelligence or disrupt the target groups’ plans using an agent.
But as America moved away from an Anglo-Saxon nation, individual criminal organizations became harder to infiltrate, due to cultural and linguistic barriers to entryism. Piercing those männerbunds would require bilingual agents, who resemble the target groups’ members and know the culture. As the CIA was coming into existence, part of its justification to Washington was that the FBI was sending a bunch of Texas or Midwest agents with farm boy accents to speak horrible Spanish in Latin America.
Multiculturalism forces security units to add time, expense, and training efforts to recruit individuals with knowledge or membership of the target groups’ more and norms (if not language and looks). This works easier at more local units that have members of those communities, but it also requires a dominant culture of rule of law to entice individuals to support the security force. This is also why simple ideological battles are easier to infiltrate than along race and religion lines. Blood, culture, and custom are all based in biology, as all behavioral traits are heritable. The FBI did not use undercover agents to penetrate the Italian mob until the 1970s. The problem arises that this undercover concept can be used against the security force.
This idea is famously exemplified in the story of John Connolly. Connolly was a good Irish boy from the neighborhood who made it to Boston College and the FBI. Connolly was also from the neighborhood of the Bulger brothers, using connections to the “good” Bulger to get his job and lifelong association with the “bad” Bulger to be a double agent. Connolly was meant to investigate the criminal enterprises in New England, but he ended up providing those enterprises, especially Bulger’s, with information. Connolly had been a double agent. Despite suspicions, no one pushed him his entire career. This story, along with Bulger’s money to the IRA, should also serve as a warning of integrating other groups into a home culture as it took America 150 years to coerce the Irish out of bad habits.
The further a target group in race, religion, ethnicity or thede, the harder the use of undercover agents becomes and the easier for use of double agents by the target group. Piercing more alien groups would require even deeper insertion or from the specific neighborhood or mosque. A host nation will need some way to monitor criminal männerbunds, and selecting individuals from those groups to work within their police or intelligence force will become a necessity to implement such systems. The loyalty is difficult to secure, and this is part of the problem to reporting on French or German authorities knowing or being aware of a terrorist before his act. Many are simply the criminal informants for the police forces of their host nation.
This difficulty in inserting agents then leads to a worse risk: the triple-agent. This is an agent of the target organization who volunteers as an informant or spy, but in reality is still loyal and working for the target organization. America has been burned by this recently with a triple agent who killed seven CIA agents in Afghanistan. Loyalty is always difficult to gauge when dealing with an informant, but especially so when the informant comes from more alien communities. Use of such informants becomes more desirable, though, as target groups have ever specific origins with more clannish behavior and longer cultural memories. An American may ask someone to wipe the slate clean, but an Arab will remember a family injustice from hundreds of years ago.
The problem of intelligence and security in foreign realms is always a concern and a difficult problem to solve. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, media experts bemoaned America’s lack of human intelligence in the Muslim world. Starting in the 1970s, the CIA reduced its physical asset pool and began the great reliance on signal intelligence and technology. Holes form due to this focus. These holes are an external threat, and if agent recruitment must occur, the threats are from external sources.
This is why immigration and multiculturalism are a threat to national security. Crime and terror can be imported. Importing foreign cultures also weakens the community not purely from trust levels but in how internal threats are tackled. Not just immediate threats, but also the glorification of inclusion, which encourages diversity of backgrounds for the handlers of sensitive material. A local männerbund is weaker due to allegiance to an outside source greater than the immediate man-to-man network of the community. A nation is weakened as its local networks erode and bonds decay, or never even form.